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Abstract 
Ergonomics is concerned with how humans interact with systems to perform tasks that 
achieve goals. This interaction requires thought processes that construct and manipulate 
mental representations of situations to enable the selection of task-oriented actions 
having predicted outcomes. The argument for a link between concepts of mental 
representation and the concerns of ergonomists is a critical theme in the present review, 
which assesses the current state of knowledge regarding the nature of mental 
representations and the way in which they are deployed to enable effective system 
interaction. Other issues that we tackle head on include: (1) the vast range of existing 
terminology that underpins discussions about representational constructs; (2) the 
important role of memory in understanding mental representation; and (3) the tight 
coupling between external and internal representations during task performance. We 
conclude by proposing a novel, explanatory framework that aims to integrate disparate 
notions of mental and external representation. 
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1.  Introduction 
To perform a task or to interact with a system requires thought processes that create and 
transform mental representations of the existing situation (Bedny et al. 2004). Such 
representations enable the selection of task-based action sequences that have predicted 
outcomes relating to the attainment of current goals. Of course, the view that thinking 
involves the use of mental representations is not a recent one. Great thinkers such as 
Plato, Aristotle, Archimedes, Galileo and Einstein all explained how they used mental 
imagery in their creative work (Franklin 2000). In the first half of the last century, too, 
Craik (1943) referred to a different representational modality to imagery when he 
suggested that people mentally construct ‘small-scale models’ of reality that can be used 
to ‘try out various alternatives’. Indeed, the idea that thinking depends upon such mental 
models has driven a considerable amount of research over the past few decades (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird 1983, 2005, Gentner and Stevens 1983, Wilson and Rutherford 1989, 
Moray 1999). A related representational notion to mental models and images is that of 
‘conceptual models’, proposed by Welford (1961) in an ergonomics context to describe 
system operators’ approximate, inexact, holistic mental images of systems that are 
acquired through experience.  
 
The aim of our opening sentence was to claim a link between ergonomic issues 
concerning effective system interaction, and concepts of mental representation. We are 
certain that many ergonomists are familiar with this proposed link and accept its value 
(for examples of research examining ergonomics problems that pay close attention to 
issues of mental representation see Mogford 1997, Thatcher and Greyling, 1998, 
Niessen et al.1999, and Sinreich et al. 2005). We also appreciate, however, that some 
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more skeptical ergonomists may still question why they might benefit from any interest 
in mental representation. Perhaps a striking answer to such skeptical voices is to note 
that mental representations—and particularly deficiencies in them—seem typically to 
play out in the emergence of many accidents in high-reliability organisations. First, 
consider the Chernobyl nuclear accident that occurred in 1986 during a routine system 
test (see Medvedev 1991). Johnson-Laird (1999) proposes that an important contributor 
to the runaway nuclear reaction that arose was a failure on the part of the scientists who 
were conducting the test to draw a logically valid Modus Tollens inference from their 
model of the following rule: ‘If the test is to continue, then the turbine must be rotating 
fast enough’. Thus, with the knowledge that the turbine was not rotating fast enough the 
logical conclusion to deduce would have been that the test was not to continue. But the 
test did continue and a disaster ensued. Second, consider the role of mental 
representation in the Three-Mile Island nuclear core-meltdown incident in 1979. In the 
run-up to this incident the operators pushed a button to close a valve. The indicator light 
on the control panel signified that the valve was closed when, in fact, it was still open. 
The operators did not know that the indicator light did not monitor the valve itself, but 
the signal to the valve. This signal was telling the valve to shut, but it failed to do this 
because of a fault. In this incident the operators’ conceptual model of this part of the 
system was incorrect (arguably owing to poor design). Thus the mental representations 
used to deal with problems as they arose during the incident were incorrect, being based 
upon an erroneous conceptual model.  
 
At a more routine level there is a clear use of mental representations in object-
assembly tasks—an ergonomic domain that we have considerable interest in (e.g. 
Richardson et al. 2006) and that we will refer to repeatedly in this review as a way to 
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illustrate theoretical concepts with content-based examples. We simply note here that if 
people had no recourse to mental representations in object-assembly tasks then all 
assembly procedures would have to be tested by physical trial-and-error manipulations 
that operated directly on external objects. For example, in relation to the 2-D shapes in 
Figure 1, it can be seen—through mental representation—that B will join with C and 
not with A, and that A will not join with C. Physical manipulation is not required. We 
suggest that such simple examples provide compelling evidence for internal 
representations such as mental imagery underpinning mental-rotation processes. 
Imagery has also been claimed to underlie people’s understanding of mechanical 
systems (Shepard and Metzler 1971, Hegarty 2003), and imagery may well be a key 
medium for thought (Denis 1991). However, as will be discussed subsequently, mental 
representations of devices do not have to be image-based, and representational 
constructs such as mental models may offer a non-visual medium for thought that has 
different properties to that of imagery (cf. Johnson-Laird 1996).  
 
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Suffice it to say for now, that we believe there are good arguments as well as 
impressive bodies of empirical evidence to attest to the importance of mental 
representations in task performance and system interaction. As such, we are keen to 
stress the value to ergonomists of a serious consideration of theoretical issues 
concerning the nature of functioning of mental representations. At the same time, we 
remain acutely aware that despite periodic attempts to clarify conceptual issues 
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concerning mental representation, the theorizing in this area continues to evolve rapidly 
and in an increasingly disconnected manner, hampered by a vast array of loose and 
overlapping terminology. For example, it is already apparent from the introduction that 
there are various different types of mental representation and a range of uses of the term 
mental model. 
 
The present paper attempts to tackle such terminological and conceptual 
fragmentation head-on, so as to integrate the disparate notions of mental representation 
within a common theoretical framework. In progressing toward this framework we will 
begin with a detailed consideration of a variety of existing (and emerging) terminology 
that underpins discussions about representational constructs, including the important 
distinction between static and dynamic representations. We then discuss the important 
role of memory in understanding mental representation, as well as the tight coupling 
that exists between external and internal representations. Finally, we highlight apparent 
conceptual convergences in the literature and present a generic and unified 
representational framework that, we argue, has greater utility than the numerous task-
specific proposals that have tended to dominate theorizing to date. 
  
2.  Mental models, conceptual models and mental imagery 
2.1. What is a mental model? 
There is much theoretical and applied research that refers to mental models, but the lack 
of unified terminology is confusing, especially when the same type of model is 
described with different vocabulary, by different authors, from different disciplines, and 
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from different perspectives (cf. Wilson and Rutherford 1989, Nielsen 1990, Payne et al. 
1990, O’Malley and Draper 1992, Moray 1999). Indeed, we would argue that the 
advancement and integration of knowledge in relation to representational constructs is 
severely hindered by the lack of any serious attempt at developing unified terminology. 
Table 1, although not exhaustive, gives a good impression of the current confusion in 
terminology when researchers refer to mental representations in general, and mental 
models in particular. In this section we start to provide an overview of the concepts 
summarized in Table 1, and we additionally introduce the broader theoretical 
perspectives that subsume these representational notions.  
 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
 
To begin with, the most generic concepts are those of ‘mental representation’ and 
‘internal representation’ (e.g. de Vega et al. 1996) which are equivalent, catchall 
concepts that serve to form a useful contrast class to notions of ‘non-mental’ 
representation or ‘external’ representation. Sometimes, however, the terms mental or 
internal representation are used synonymously with that of mental models (as noted by 
Wilson and Rutherford 1989), although mental models are just one form of mental 
representation. Indeed, Johnson-Laird (1983) proposed three distinct types of mental 
representation, which many other researchers would also recognise, even if disagreeing 
with details. First, there are propositional representations that encompass information in 
a way that resembles natural language, though in a tightly-constrained syntactic form. 
Second, there are ‘mental images’ that represent information in a visuo-spatial format. 
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Third, there are mental models that are structural analogues of physical objects or states 
of affairs in the world.  
 
The first two types of representation described by Johnson-Laird (1983) link 
closely with Paivio’s (1971) ‘dual-coding’ view of cognition as involving two 
functionally separate yet interconnected representational systems specialized for 
processing either verbal and linguistic information (a propositional coding system) or 
non-verbal information (an image coding system). Johnson-Laird’s third, models-based 
representational system involves abstract elements that cannot be visualized, but which 
reflect spatial information. Fleming et al. (in  press) have shown that congenitally blind 
people with no visual experience are still able to construct such models—a finding that 
underlines their abstract, non-visual nature. Johnson-Laird further proposes that mental 
models and mental imagery are very closely related as ‘images are views of models’, 
with a model underlying the image (Johnson-Laird 1983, p. 157). The critical 
distinction between models and images remains, however, in that models are non-visual 
whereas images have a dominant visual component. More recently, Johnson-Laird 
(1996, 2004) has distanced himself from his earlier proposal that images are specific 
views of models, and he now sees images and models as being entirely separable 
representations. Given the impact of Johnson-Laird’s mental models concept in domains 
as far ranging as reasoning, decision making, language processing, problem solving and 
creativity, the concept cannot be ignored, even if the precision of the notion is 
sometimes less than clear even in Johnson-Laird’s own writings, where the 
representational construct is often finessed with the specific ‘mental models theory’ of 
reasoning (Johnson-Laird 2005). 
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The strength and general applicability of Johnson-Laird’s mental models concept 
is supported by Manktelow and Jones (1987), who claim that users’ models of 
interactive systems and devices (e.g. computer-based technologies) are an instantiation 
of mental models as described by Johnson-Laird (1983), and therefore work along the 
same essential principles. Similarly, Moray (1999) argues that people may use mental 
models in the way described by Johnson-Laird (1983) in a wide range of domains, 
including Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and the navigation of supertankers. 
However, whilst these applications of the mental models concept further justify an 
acceptance of Johnson-Laird’s terminology, we note that over the past few decades the 
term has been freely invoked in applied domains to refer to virtually any representation 
of the knowledge that a person may possess about physical devices (Tauber 1988).  
 
Moray (1999) relates the differences in the use of mental models terminology to 
differences in the contexts in which people are forming and using mental models—with 
reference to the coupling between human, task and environment—and not to differences 
in the mental models concept per se. Nevertheless, the confusion of what constitutes a 
mental model can be seen from Table 1 and has existed (and been debated) for many 
years. In a particularly important review paper, Wilson and Rutherford (1989) examined 
mental models terminology and concluded that a ‘mental model is a representation 
formed by the user of a system and/or task, based on previous experience as well as 
current observation, which provides most (if not all) of their subsequent system 
understanding and consequently dictates the level of task performance’ (p. 619). This 
view is, again, closely allied to Johnson-Laird’s theoretical position, as Wilson and 
Rutherford themselves acknowledge. In addition, Wilson and Rutherford give us an 
important reminder that in Johnson-Laird’s theory (e.g. Johnson-Laird et al. 1992), 
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mental models are assumed to be constructed and manipulated within working memory 
(WM) rather than long-term memory (LTM). As we will discuss below, the role of WM 
as a mental substrate for model construction is critical in distinguishing between the 
notion of a mental model and that of a ‘conceptual model’. 
 
Given the apparent generality of the mental models notion, a question that 
remains is: How are these models used in everyday tasks? The simple answer—as we 
noted in our introduction—is that they enable ‘thinking’, and in particular allow 
someone to predict the outcomes of their task-oriented or system-based actions. Indeed, 
the theoretical foundation of the mental models concept has been established through 
extensive laboratory research into specific types of thinking, such as deductive 
reasoning. However, as Johnson-Laird (2005) notes, in daily life no clear separation 
exists between different forms of thinking, such as deduction, induction or abduction. 
Earlier we considered how errors specifically associated with deductive reasoning were 
a likely contributing factor in the Chernobyl disaster, but apart from this one example, 
other salient illustrations of how mental models may underpin deductive competence or 
deductive failure in applied contexts are not that common. However, when the concept 
of mental models is considered more generally than in the limited sense of a 
representation underpinning deduction, then other applied examples are more readily 
forthcoming. For example, Shalin et al. (1996) consider mental models in their 
cognitive perspective on assembly tasks, and propose that people working from an 
inadequate mental model are disadvantaged owing to the model itself, which can have a 
persisting influence on performance (Gopher et al. 1985) as people protect their 
misconceptions (Feltovich et al. 1994), despite explicit instructions to strive to 
overcome them.  
M. Richardson & L. J. Ball 
 12 
 
This difficulty in overcoming ‘incorrect’ models (even subsequent to explicit 
instruction) has also been noted by DiSessa (1982) and McCloskey et al. (1980), and it 
seems to arise because people avoid multiple perspectives when faced with a problem 
because such alternatives introduce too many action sequences to think about given the 
inherent limitations of WM capacity (cf. Feltovich et al. 1992). This account also relates 
to the phenomenon of ‘cognitive tunnel vision’, which is interpreted by Moray (1999) 
as the choice of an inappropriate mental model coupled with an unwillingness to change 
to a potentially more appropriate model. Interestingly, these tendencies toward a limited 
focus on initial mental models are also a cornerstone of Johnson-Laird’s mental models 
theory of reasoning (cf. Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s 2002 ‘principle of truth’ that drives 
model construction; see also Sloutsky & Golvarg, 2004, for discussion of the concept of 
‘minimalist’ mental models). It is also recognised by Johnson-Laird (e.g. 2001) that 
knowledge and beliefs can have a profound affect on thinking and reasoning; sometimes 
beliefs can limit people’s construction of alternative models, whilst at other times they 
can encourage a more exhaustive construction of possible models (see Ball et al. 2006, 
for a recent discussion of belief-bias effects in model-based deduction). 
2.2.  Mental simulation and runnable mental models 
Closely linked to the concept of mental models is the notion of ‘mental simulation’, a 
term originally introduced by Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) in decision-making research 
to refer to a process where a sequence of events is consciously enacted (e.g. to 
determine cause-effect relationships or to predict the likely outcomes of actions). The 
idea of mental simulation was quickly adopted by Kahneman and Tversky (e.g. 1982) in 
their pioneering research on heuristics and biases in reasoning and decision making, 
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where they discussed the concept of a ‘simulation heuristic’ that could enable predictive 
reasoning and judgemental forecasting. Yet another concept that appears to be 
synonymous with the idea of mental simulation is that models can be ‘run’ in order to 
test out possible outcomes in advance of some action (Ehrlich 1996). Indeed, in the 
important edited collection of papers by Gentner and Stevens entitled ‘Mental Models’ 
published in 1983 (coincidentally the same year as Johnson-Laird’s identically-titled 
monograph) several authors expand on the issue of running mental models. For 
example, Norman (1983, p. 13) states that users’ models are constantly refined during 
user-system interaction, and refers to running a mental model in order to make 
predictions; Williams et al. (1983, p.1 33) refer to mental models that are ‘runnable’; 
and De Kleer and Brown (1983, p. 156) refer to ‘envisioning’ or constructing mental 
models and then the simulation or running of these models.  
 
Klein and Crandall (1995) also discuss mental simulation and relate this more 
broadly to perspectives such as mental models, mental imagery and the simulation 
heuristic. They use the wider meaning of the term mental model as ‘representing 
knowledge’, although they also note the difficulty with this in that the term becomes 
over-general by referring to everything a person knows (cf. Rouse and Morris 1986). 
However, a particularly interesting contribution that Klein and Crandall make to 
theoretical clarification relates to their proposals that, first, mental simulation uses a 
subset of information from a mental model to run action sequences, and second, that 
running such action sequences can be perceptually driven and will be limited by 
capacity constraints of WM. In addition, Klein and Crandall report studies where people 
were required to use mental simulation to undertake tasks. By studying people’s verbal 
reports, Klein and Crandall (1995) identify four primary functions of the simulation 
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process: (1) to generate a course of action; (2) to evaluate a course of action; (3) to 
explain a phenomenon; and (4) to explore models of a phenomenon. Although Klein 
and Crandall list these functions and provide an account of mental simulation, it is not 
clear what exact form these simulations take—other than that they are linked closely to, 
and are a subset of, mental models in the broadest sense. As such, the relative roles of 
an imagery format versus an abstract model format remain unclear within this theory. 
Of course, whether there is a real need to know the format of the mental representations 
that underlie thinking is a moot point. The side of the debate that we take is to argue that 
such knowledge should allow us to understand more about the limitations and 
characteristics of human cognition, which should, in turn, enable us to optimize the fit 
between tasks and humans—a goal that is at the heart of ergonomics practice. We will 
return to this idea of running mental models in a later section where we discuss the 
crucial distinction between static and dynamic models. 
2.3. What is a conceptual model? 
Welford (1961) proposed the notion of a ‘conceptual model’ and saw it as an 
approximate, inexact, yet holistic mental image that is not task specific. This term has 
tended to be used primarily in theories of representation in applied domains such as HCI 
and ergonomics, but as with the mental model concept, there has been much debate as 
to what a conceptual model actually refers to. Young (1983) suggests that a conceptual 
model is a representation of a system that is adopted to guide actions and interpret 
system behaviour, whilst Wilson and Rutherford (1989) propose that it should be seen 
as ‘the user’s representation of the system, defined in terms as structured or loose as 
desired’ (p. 631). Card and Moran (1986) describe a user’s conceptual model of a 
computer system as an abstraction of the system and its components that allows the user 
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to predict the system’s state after commands have been executed, to facilitate methods 
for carrying out novel tasks, and to handle system errors. This latter definition 
highlights a key difference between tasks in different domains, such as HCI as opposed 
to object assembly. In HCI the user needs some kind of model of the computer system 
and how it functions in order to operate the system effectively to pursue task-related 
goals; in object assembly, in contrast, there are no inner workings of a system that need 
to be understood, and the task at hand is, therefore, more transparent, arguably requiring 
different levels of mental representation. 
 
The various definitions of conceptual models can seem similar to most 
descriptions of mental models, leaving one with the view that a conceptual model is 
nothing more or less than a mental model. Norman (1983), however, takes an 
interesting stance on these definitional matters and warns that the conceptualization of a 
system should not be confused with a user’s mental model of that system. Furthermore, 
he describes conceptual models as being invented by designers and teachers and being 
taught to users. But what Norman seems to be describing is more a distinction between 
the system models possessed by designers (or teachers) versus those possessed by users. 
In contrast, other authors (e.g. Wilson and Rutherford 1989) seem to be concerned more 
with a different distinction, that is, between users’ conceptual models (i.e. models of 
systems) versus users’ mental models (i.e. models of possible operations and actions 
that can be performed using systems). 
 
To gain greater clarification on these definitional issues we next turn to a brief 
consideration of the ‘activity theory’ approach that emerged in the former Soviet Union 
(e.g. Zinchenko et al. 1978; we also discuss activity theory in greater detail below). 
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Activity theory embraces Welford’s (1961) notion of a conceptual model, and further 
refines its definition in some highly informative ways. Bedny et al. (2004) give a clear 
account of the notion of a conceptual model as espoused by activity theory, which is a 
model that is based on experience and instruction and which is seen as existing in 
LTM—which renders it both static and resistant to change. So, a conceptual model can 
be seen as a person’s holistic representation of a task or system and its parts, whereas 
mental models and imagery relate to the cognitive processes required to construct 
hypothetical actions and action sequence, which themselves draw upon information in 
the conceptual model. This process whereby the static conceptual model populates a 
working or dynamic mental representation or model can be identified as a mediator of 
task performance and a source of error. In the Three-Mile Island example given earlier, 
an incorrect conceptual model of the system led to incorrect dynamic mental 
representations and poor problem solving.  
 
In terms of attaining effective task performance, the available instructions and the 
device itself need to match the conceptual model held by the user. For example, when 
implementing new devices people’s existing conceptual models should be considered, 
especially as they are static and resistant to change. Consider a standard pay-and-display 
ticket machine in a car-park: You insert the requisite value of coins, push the salient 
button and take your ticket. Excerpts from two press reports below show how even 
simple devices can cause chaos if they ignore users’ existing conceptual models: 
 
CONTROVERSIAL new ticket machines have led to chaos in a town centre’s 
biggest car park. A new council parking system – which requires drivers to type in 
the digits from their vehicle's registration number before they can get their tickets – 
caused jams in the town’s Central Area car park over the weekend as bemused 
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motorists attempted to figure it out. Many were angry that there had been no 
advance warning of the new system, which led to lengthy queues and heated scenes 
at the ticket machines. A man with an engineering degree was fined £40 for being 
unable to use a machine….he and other motorists where flummoxed by the new 
system when he visited the town on Saturday. The council employee who is 
overseeing the introduction of the new machines, said: “You can’t legislate for 
thick. Some people are just so stupid. You type in the numbers of your registration, 
put your money in and press the green button. I can’t see how simpler it could be, 
other than having somebody standing there to help. 
Bradshaw, T. Burton Mail 12/05/2003 and 22/05/2003 
 
A further example of the importance of effective conceptual models can be given 
in the domain of object assembly. Baggett and Ehrenfeucht (1988) studied people’s 
‘conceptualizations’ of objects so that assembly instructions could be designed to match 
them. They found major individual differences in conceptual models of objects, which 
presents a further factor for consideration by task designers and trainers, and which also 
raises the issue of how conceptual models are formed in the first place. In object 
assembly, conceptualizations are seen as how people think about an object, which is 
defined in terms of an object’s perceptually salient and functionally significant parts 
(Tversky and Hemenway 1984). So, just by looking at an object it would seem that we 
form a conceptual model, and that one person’s model may differ quite radically from 
another person’s. Similarly, merely by interacting with a device we will form a 
conceptual model of how it operates, and often this model will be incomplete and 
inaccurate.  
 
Norman (1988) emphasizes these latter points well when he proposes that our 
conceptual models are formed, in part, to allow us to explain what is observed. For 
M. Richardson & L. J. Ball 
 18 
example thermostats have three possible conceptualizations, only one of which is 
correct. Consider a cold room that a user wishes to heat up. The three conceptualizations 
are: 
 
•A valve theory—Turn the thermostat all the way up and heat of a greater 
temperature is produced such that the room will get warmer faster.  
•A timer theory—Turn the thermostat up and the heating will stay on at the same 
temperature for a greater proportion of time. 
•A switch theory—Turn the thermostat up and the heating stays on at full power 
until the temperature set is reached, at which point the heating then switches off.  
 
Users of a thermostat may well possess one of the erroneous theories (conceptual 
models) of a thermostat, that may be formed from observation alone. Indeed, some 
systems such as thermostats give no hint as to their internal workings and the correct 
model that should be formed of their functioning. Without further information the 
conceptual model that a person develops is free to account for facts as perceived. As we 
have seen, too, in some situations erroneous conceptual models can have serious 
consequences. 
 
A good conceptual model requires a transparent device; for example, the workings 
of a bicycle are visible and can facilitate a good conceptual model of how controls relate 
to functions (e.g. handlebars to steering). In contrast, a digital watch with four buttons 
gives no indication of the relationship between controls and functions (Norman 1988). 
Norman proposes that conceptual models are built from a range of factors such as 
affordances, mapping, population stereotypes, instructions, interactions and transfer 
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from similar devices. Conceptual models may be incorrect if the above attributes are 
misleading. This can then lead to task difficulties, since conceptual models provide 
information to allow people to simulate mentally the operation of a device and to decide 
upon actions. If the conceptual model is wrong then the actions arising from the model 
may be wrong, and mistakes can happen.  
 
Research has also demonstrated that people can overrate their level of 
understanding or knowledge of functional systems (Rozenblit and Keil 2002). Lawson 
(2006) examined people's conceptual knowledge of a simple and transparent everyday 
device, the bicycle. She found people, including cyclists, had a striking inability to 
produce accurate information about bicycle function and that conceptual understanding 
was ‘sketchy and shallow’. The frequent and serious mistakes found cast some doubt on 
the role of conceptual models described above. However, we rarely work from 
conceptual knowledge alone; during a task when people are simulating the operation of 
a device they have the external representation of the task available. Hence, our 
inadequate conceptual knowledge of the bicycle is supplemented, allowing a fuller 
mental model of the device to be created for problem solving. The importance of 
external representations will be discussed later. 
2.4.  Visuospatial cognition and mental imagery 
Many tasks involve visual and spatial information and operations, and visuospatial 
representations allow people to process visuospatial information and perform mental 
transformations associated with problem solving and the attainment of task-related 
goals (de Vega and Marschark 1996). Mental imagery can be thought of as the key 
example of visuospatial cognition, and Shepard and Metzler (1971) have provided some 
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compelling (though not uncontested) evidence for the role of image-based 
representations in tasks such as mental-rotation. The term imagery refers to the 
processes that underpin the representation of structural, modality-specific properties of 
objects. Rather judiciously, Denis (1991) does not accept the rather extreme views that 
‘imagery is thinking’ or that ‘thinking involves only abstract representations’. Instead, 
imagery is seen as being one potential medium for thought, but not at its core. The 
properties of imagery can vary, with Denis describing instances of single or multiple 
images that may simply be read or that may be manipulated to perform realistic 
simulations of physical objects. Mental images, then, are a seemingly important part of 
human cognition and can be further divided into visuospatial representations in 2-D or 
3-D (Knauff and Johnson-Laird 2002).  
 
It appears that incoming visual and spatial information is processed through the 
visual system and that mental representations can have visuospatial properties similar to 
the object being represented. Indeed, the concept of ‘analogue imagery’ denotes the 
high level of structural isomorphism that can exist between an external object and the 
object as represented mentally (Denis 1991). Many researchers have also argued that 
visuospatial representations cannot be reduced to propositional code (de Vega et al. 
1996), though see Anderson (1978) and Pylyshyn (2003) for alternative views. 
Although visual perception and mental imagery are different, it is likely that they share 
neurological and psychological mechanisms (Kosslyn 1994). This view is supported by 
studies of unilateral spatial neglect patients whose representational deficits on 
remembered images mirror their perceptual neglect (Bisiach and Luzzati 1978). Kosslyn 
et al. (1995) also found evidence of visual area activation with mental imagery. 
However, double dissociations found since make it untenable to claim identical imagery 
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and perceptual systems, although a fair degree of overlap seems likely (see Bartolomeo 
2002 for a review). Farah (1988) also concludes that imagery is not visual in the sense 
of a ‘mind’s eye’, but rather imagery shares some of the same processes as vision. 
Furthermore, Farah suggests that people have a choice of using either visual or non-
visual spatial representations, depending upon the problem at hand and their experience. 
 
The similarity and differences between perceptually-based images and mental 
images can be defined further. There is strong evidence that mental images retain 
properties of their referents and that the spatial manipulation of representations—such 
as arises in mental rotation or in tasks such as object assembly—involves continuous 
mental transformation or analogue imagery (e.g. Paivio 1975, Kosslyn 1978). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that visuospatial images are conceptually based and 
are derived from top-down memory retrieval, that is, they are not like perceptual images 
that are built up from edges and shadows (de Vega and Marschark 1996). These points 
are of considerable interest and relate to our previous discussion regarding mental 
models and conceptual models, as it would seem that a person’s conceptual model could 
also inform their mental imagery. 
 
So, how might mental imagery be used during a task? In Figure 1 an example was 
presented whereby mental imagery would allow the manipulation of elements of a task 
to enable predictions. As such, metal imagery would be a core aspect of a task such as 
object assembly. Likewise, Schwartz and Black (1996) refer to everyday situations 
where people infer physical events or solve mechanical problems—such as the meshing 
of two gears—using analogue spatial imagery. Mental imagery can also be used to 
understand mechanical devices such as toilet cisterns, where it seems that people follow 
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a chain of events and infer the motion of components one at a time, rather than pursuing 
a more realistic mental animation with components in simultaneous motion (Hegarty et 
al. 2003). 
2.5.  Interim summary 
So far we have discussed in detail three main forms of mental representation: mental 
models, conceptual models and mental imagery. Mental models and mental imagery 
relate to cognitive processes that are required to pursue ‘hypothetical thinking’ about 
possible actions (cf. Evans and Over 2004). Both types of representation appear to be 
constructed and manipulated within WM. Conceptual models, in contrast, reflect a more 
holistic understanding of systems, and are primarily held within LTM. The present 
theoretical clarification concerning the nature and cognitive locus of mental models and 
conceptual models seems useful as a counterpoint to the often loose and ambiguous 
terminology that pervades applied research. Indeed, we would urge all researchers who 
are referring to mental representations to make some attempt to clarify how they are 
using terminology in terms of both the nature of the representations that they are 
discussing as well as the assumed location of these representations within the cognitive 
system. We will now move on to consider in detail two research traditions that have 
been especially helpful in informing the debate over the nature of mental 
representations, that is, situation awareness and activity theory (the latter was briefly 
discussed above in relation to the concept of conceptual models). 
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3.  Situation awareness and activity theory in understanding representational 
issues 
3.1.  The impact of situation awareness 
The increasing size and complexity of modern technological systems, together with the 
sheer volume of data available to the human operator, have led to a dramatic burgeoning 
of interest in the concept of ‘situation awareness’ (SA), which refers to ‘a person’s 
mental model of the world around them’ (Endsley 2000b, p. 2). SA, therefore, is 
fundamentally concerned with an individual’s knowledge of the prevailing context in 
which they are operating, as well as the information that is important for achieving task-
oriented goals. SA is derived via the cues received through our senses and provided by 
systems or the surrounding environment, for example, warning lights or the tone of an 
engine. Endsley (2000) presents a visual depiction of her model of SA which shows it 
as an operator’s ‘internal model’ of the state of the environment—a representation that 
requires perception, comprehension and projection or prediction of future events, and 
which forms a basis for decision making. Furthermore, Endsley (2000) emphasizes how 
a full SA can help decision making but cannot guarantee a correct decision. This is 
because knowledge, experience, technical limitations and individual differences (e.g. in 
personality or motivational dispositions) may well all hinder optimal decision making.  
 
In discussing SA, Endsley (2000) places mental models within LTM, and 
associates them with the concept of schemata, a form of knowledge representation in 
LTM that will be discussed below. The use of mental models in SA depends crucially 
on the operator being able to match environmental cues to their mental model. This 
choice of terminology is repeated throughout the SA literature, but interestingly 
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overlooks the mental models notion as espoused by Johnson-Laird and colleagues. 
Instead, Endsley’s concept of a mental model really describes a ‘conceptual model’ as 
discussed in the previous section (see Welford 1961). However, Endsley also introduces 
new terminology with the concept of a ‘situation model’, which describes the current 
state of a mental model, presumably as represented in WM. This situation model guides 
attention, integrates information perceived and provides a mechanism for predicting 
future sates of the system. Whatever the chosen terminology, Endsley presents studies 
demonstrating that problems with mental models accounted for 18% of the SA errors 
observed. These problems included the existence of poor models, the use of incorrect 
models, and over-reliance on default values within models. 
 
SA requires perceived information to be compared with goal states and projected 
into the future, a process that places heavy demands on WM. Endsley (2000) argues that 
SA is not itself solely located in either WM or LTM. Rather, information from the 
senses activates LTM representations such as schemata and other static mental 
representations; these then enable recognition processes and the generation of salient 
recognition products that are maintained in WM. The relationship between models in 
LTM and WM in SA theory is clearly congruent with the conclusions in Section 2 
concerning the nature of conceptual models and mental models. As will be discussed 
later, Bedny et al. (2004) also observe that the mental and situational models in SA are 
similar to the conceptual and dynamic models of activity theory. Such overlapping 
notions across different theoretical perspectives is very encouraging for the 
development of an integrated perspective on representational issues. Such conceptual 
consistency clearly allows for greater unity and crossover between different theories and 
approaches.  
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One especially appealing aspect of SA is that it goes beyond mere concerns with 
situations and additionally provides an encompassing theoretical framework to facilitate 
the systematic analysis and design of complex systems from a cognitive perspective. 
For example, SA would deal with a task such as object assembly in terms of: (1) the 
inputs arising from the external world, such as the perceived current state of the object 
assembly and incoming information from the task instructions; (2) the goals, mental 
models and schemata that are held in memory and the way that they are activated by, 
and combined with, external inputs to create an internal representation of the current 
state of the object assembly; and (3) the comparison between perceived information and 
current goal states, and the projection of perceived information into the future so that a 
decision can be made on the next action to take. 
 
It will be seen in subsequent sections that the framework proposed by Endsley 
(2000) contains many of the components depicted in the ‘relations of mappings’ in 
mental models as described by Moray (1999), as well as key aspects of Zhang’s (1997) 
theoretical proposals for discussing the role of external representations in problem 
solving. A framework such as SA seems very powerful, and its application is potentially 
wide ranging. It would clearly be beneficial to see how far SA theory can be integrated 
with other dominant theoretical frameworks—a theme that we will return to later on in 
this review. One final aspect of cognition that is not commonly covered in discussions 
of mental representations but which is highlighted very well in SA theory is the 
dimension of ‘time’, that is, the temporal aspects of a current task (e.g. rate of change, 
perception of time, and time available to complete the task). Temporal factors are 
critical when considering human awareness in a developing situation. Although not 
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explicitly mentioned by mental models theory or imagery-based theories of 
representation, it is likely that such accounts are capable of dealing with temporal 
issues. 
3.2.  Activity theory: An alternative perspective 
In terminology which is relatively new to the Western World we can see how a similar 
framework of cognition to SA theory developed in the former Soviet Union in the form 
of ‘activity theory’ (AT). AT is a psychological approach for the study of work-based 
behaviours that is goal-directed in its emphasis (see Bedny et al. 2000, for a review). 
Moreover, within AT cognitive, motivational and behavioural constructs are unified and 
the concept of ‘action’ gains centre stage in connecting theory to practice (e.g. in 
domains such as ergonomics). As such, AT is an extremely broad and all-encompassing 
framework that extends well beyond the present paper’s more modest ambition for a 
unified framework for considering issues concerning internal and external 
‘representation’.  
 
Despite its breadth, there is no doubt that the AT approach provides a valuable 
supplement to the human information processing approach used in ergonomics, and also 
has relevance to the present discussion of mental representations. AT classifies ‘mental 
actions’ as being the building blocks of activity, and includes representations as a core 
element of these mental actions. Some mental actions are direct perceptual events, such 
as recognition of a familiar object, whilst others include imaginative actions or mental 
imagery. In addition, AT includes functional blocks, which include a mechanism termed 
the ‘operative image’ - a ‘dynamic reflection of a situation in imaginative form that is 
not always accessible to verbalization’ (Bedny et al. 2000, p. 198). The operative image 
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of the task conditions will be especially critical during the performance of a dynamic 
task. 
 
Nusulenko et al. (2005) provide a further discussion of engineering psychology in 
Russia centred on AT and human-machine interaction, and reveal further terminology. 
They introduce the concept of an ‘image-goal’, which is the reflection of a device in a 
mental image that must be related to the current task-goal. This image-goal absorbs the 
operator’s experience and also requires information about the system’s current 
condition. This information is perceived by the operator and consists of information 
from the device as well as non-device information that can be the prime determinant of 
behaviour. Furthermore, the perception of the device will be mediated by technology. 
Nusulenko et al. relate the concept of an image-goal to the notions of a ‘conceptual 
model’ and an ‘operative image’ mentioned above (Oshanin 1966). First, the conceptual 
model is seen as essential in activity as it integrates an individual’s experience and 
knowledge of the system. By Nusulenko et al.’s definition the conceptual model 
includes device/system characteristics, dynamics and structure, including possible 
actions and mental images of real and predicted events. It is a set of relevant 
background knowledge that forms a basis for decisions (i.e. an operator’s ‘inner 
world’). During a task the operator brings into consciousness the content required for 
tackling the task. The ‘operative image or model’ differs from the conceptual model in 
that it is a mental image of the device generated during the task interaction. It is 
dynamic and regulates activity. In summary the conceptual model is relatively constant 
and the operative image is dynamic. In practice, a task will require a device or system to 
be controlled from a current state to a goal state, with the latter represented by the 
image-goal. The difficulty of the task will then be defined by the difference between the 
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conceptual model and the image-goal, and how well the image-goal and conceptual 
model are developed.  
 
In a similar vein, Bedny et al. (2004) state that operative thinking is important in 
the study of human-machine interaction, and that this involves the creation of ‘dynamic 
models’ of the situation used to develop and plan actions. The dynamic model has 
different aspects, such as imagery, and exists in WM. The conceptual model is the 
‘inner idiosyncratic world of the operator’ that is held in LTM, and is generally resistant 
to change; it is based on experience and instruction and is available to the operator 
before initial actions. In addition, the conceptual model is viewed as being task-
independent, and, therefore, can contain substantial redundancy in relation to a 
particular task, with only components relevant to current operator actions being 
extracted into a dynamic model. This essential distinction between dynamic and 
conceptual models has received rapid and widespread recognition in AT.  
 
We conclude this section by noting that AT remains an interesting approach to the 
analysis of work-based activity that has developed in parallel to Western theories. In 
addition, when considering the concept of mental representation, the published 
summaries of the AT approach present a clear framework based upon the proposed 
existence of static models in LTM and dynamic models in WM. However, although AT 
certainly provides a far-reaching and important conceptual framework, it is unlikely to 
become pervasive in Western theorizing for some time given its relatively recent 
emergence in Western research. Intriguingly, too, we note that SA theory—which has 
already gained dominance in Western theorizing—provides an impressive level of 
overlap with many core AT concepts (cf. Bedny et al. 2000). In particular, the mental 
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models and situational models in SA are similar to the dynamic models and conceptual 
models introduced in AT. It is proposed that the closer integration of AT and SA in 
future research on work-oriented behaviour would be a useful next step toward the 
enhancement of functional analyses of activity (cf. Bedny et al. 2004).  
4.  Mental representations and memory 
4.1.  The interplay between LTM and WM 
It has been proposed in previous sections that mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird et al. 
1992, Johnson-Laird 1996) and mental imagery (e.g. Narayanan and Hegarty 1998) are 
specific forms of internal representation that are held in WM, whilst conceptual models 
are primarily artifacts of long-term memory (LTM). These distinctions create a 
framework where mental representations are constructed and manipulated in WM and 
draw upon conceptual models stored in LTM. Intuitively, it certainly seems to the case 
that at any one time a person can recall a conceptual model of a device from which a 
mental model can be derived, held in WM, and used for reasoning. Moray (1999) 
similarly argues that models in LTM can be used to construct models in short-term 
memory to allow one to think about specific problems, and de Vega et al. (1996, p. 214) 
conclude that there is ‘no doubt that subjects can use existing knowledge to modulate 
visuospatial images and evaluate the plausibility of models’, although it is not clear 
whether this is automatic or subject to control and awareness. Denis (1991) considers 
the role of WM and LTM in the terms of transient versus long-term representations, and 
describes thinking as the mental activities involved in the manipulation of transient 
representations in order to construct new pieces of information. This is distinguished 
from the long-term representations which form a person’s knowledge. Likewise, in the 
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‘perceptual symbol theory’ presented by Barsalou (1999) and discussed later, it is 
argued that LTM contains representations while WM implements specific 
representations. That is, WM is the system that runs perceptual simulations during 
action or during preparation for action.  
 
These latter proposals also relate to the work of Cañas et al. (2003), where mental 
models are considered to be dynamic representations created in WM from information 
stored in LTM, and information extracted from the environment. The balance between 
the latter two determinants of mental model construction will be dependent on the user. 
Where the user lacks knowledge, Waern (1990) suggests a bottom-up approach where 
the user gradually builds a model that is based on incoming information as they interact 
with the system. In the top-down approach, users rely on existing knowledge for the 
basis of a new mental model according to information extracted from the environment. 
This use of current information and experience is consistent with the conclusion of 
Wilson and Rutherford (1989) quoted previously, and it is worth reiterating that the 
resulting mental model will dictate the level of task performance as it provides most (if 
not all) of the user’s system understanding. 
 
As we have seen, too, Bedny et al. (2004) echo these arguments and present a 
clear vision from AT, whereby the conceptual model resides in LTM and the dynamic 
model—which includes mental representations such as imagery—exists in WM. As it is 
based in LTM the conceptual model has a number of important characteristics: It is 
resistant to change, it is task independent and it is based on experience and instruction. 
These LTM/WM distinctions, however, may not be entirely rigid, and Endsley (2000) 
has argued that situation awareness is neither solely located in LTM nor WM. What is 
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clear, however, is that information from the senses activates LTM representations (i.e. 
schemata and other static mental representations) in order to be recognised, and then the 
salient products of such recognition processes are maintained within a WM system. In 
other words, there are vital mappings between conceptual models in LTM and dynamic 
models in WM. It is also possible that LTM and WM may not be physically separate 
entities as some widely accepted models of memory have suggested (e.g. Baddeley 
1986). Endsley (2000) points to the finding that pilots could refer to SA information for 
six minutes following simulation freezes and that this is not compatible with theories 
that posit a rapidly decaying WM system. Such arguments have led to calls by theorists 
for a model of WM as a subset of LTM (e.g. Cowan 1988) or a form of ‘long-term 
working memory’ (e.g. Ericsson and Kintsch 1994) .  
 
Further important ideas regarding the interplay between LTM and WM 
representations are discussed by Baguley and Payne (2000). They note that research into 
mental models in reasoning supports the view that whilst construction and manipulation 
of models occurs in WM, mental models can also be encoded in LTM to enable more 
persistent retention and retrieval. Baguley and Payne (2000) additionally discuss the 
concept of an ‘episodic construction trace’ (see also Payne 1993), which is a 
propositionally-based representation of the processes that a person went through during 
the construction of a WM-based mental model. The idea of a construction trace is 
intriguing as it provides yet another form of LTM representation that could be used as 
an aspect of subsequent behaviour (e.g. that could be utilized when having to re-
construct a mental model on a future occasion). 
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4.2.  Schemata and LTM 
The term ‘schema’ is used to denote the representation of conceptual or categorical 
knowledge in LTM (e.g. Rumelhart 1980). Schemata are described as having ‘slots’, 
which are used to structure and categorize the information linked to a schema. For 
example, a schema for a house would have a ‘materials’ slot that could have values such 
as brick or stone. Schemata, therefore, are abstract representations of ‘concepts’ and are 
built from specific instances (Anderson 2000). Furthermore, schemata are viewed as 
being hierarchically embedded one within another through levels of abstraction. Such 
hierarchical structuring allows inferences to be made, for example, from the knowledge 
that walls are parts of houses and that walls have windows, we can infer that houses 
have windows. This general description of schemata as representing concepts is 
strikingly similar to the notion of ‘conceptual models’ introduced earlier. Such 
conceptual structures are not only able to represent conceptual knowledge of objects, 
but also conceptual knowledge of events and typical action sequences, as in Schank and 
Abelson’s (1977) discussion of ‘scripts’. Scripts are a particular implementation of 
schema theory that relate specifically to everyday events and typical goal-directed 
activities (Zacks et al. 2001).  
 
Wilson and Rutherford (1989) discuss the relationships and distinctions between 
LTM constructs such as schemata and scripts (which are sometimes also seen as being 
an implementation of Minsky’s 1975 notion of ‘frames’). They suggest that these 
various theoretical constructs can be used to organize the knowledge that is required for 
any cognitive task. Whereas scripts have been employed primarily in relation to social 
activities, schemata have been applied more widely to areas such as motor actions, 
perception and decision errors. Interestingly, too, Johnson-Laird (1983, pp. 446-447) 
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has referred to schemata as ‘procedures that specify by default the values of certain 
variables in mental models’. Further, Moray (1999) sees frames and scripts as aspects of 
LTM, with the former informing the mental representations held in WM, which in turn 
inform scripts in a reciprocal manner. Wilson and Rutherford (1989) conclude that 
structures of ‘background knowledge’, such as schemata, are artifacts of LTM which, 
when activated, are utilized by mental models in a dynamic manner. This is supported 
by Johnson-Laird (1983) and Manktelow and Jones (1987), who see schemata as 
providing the means for the construction of mental models. Once again, we see that 
these ideas concerning schemata match the more general account of the role of LTM in 
task-oriented behaviour given above, where mental models were described as being 
constructed and manipulated in WM and being informed by LTM and environmental 
cues.  
5.  Further issues concerning the nature and functioning of mental representations 
5.1.  Mental representations and task specificity 
The difference between the use of the mental models concept in theoretical and applied 
research has been noted above, and derives from the distinctive emphasis of two, key 
published volumes: the monograph of Johnson-Laird (1983) and the collection of papers 
edited by Gentner and Stevens (1983). Whereas Johnson-Laird proposes a general 
cognitive theory to explain human thought, Gentner and Stevens’ volume considers 
models in relation to specific domains of expertise. For example, it contains chapters by 
Norman (1983) and Young (1983) that discuss mental models in relation to a range of 
physical or mathematical systems and devices (e.g. the instruction-based learning of 
computer systems and scientific concepts such as electricity). One clear theme in the 
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more applied emphasis of the Gentner and Stevens volume is that people’s existing 
knowledge has a considerable influence on their reasoning about a new device or 
problem. However, Payne (1992) notes that this theme is also resonant in Johnson-
Laird’s theory, which is the more well developed as it specifies the format of 
representations. Payne’s position is also supported by Manktelow and Jones (1987). 
These points, however, usefully serve to highlight a key difference in mental-models 
theorizing, which is the distinction between task-specific (or domain-specific) theories 
on the one hand and domain-general theories on the other. 
 
One area of applied research where task-specific notions of mental representation 
have tended to be the mainstay of theorizing is in the area of HCI, which is 
fundamentally interested in how users acquire knowledge of a computer system that can 
facilitate (or potentially hinder) their interaction with the system (Bibby 1992). Mental 
models in the domain of HCI, therefore, relate to how people understand and learn the 
internal functioning of devices. In other domains, however, such as object assembly, the 
tasks are more transparent and do not involve a functioning device with particular 
internal features that need to be understood. Therefore, many task-specific mental 
representation theories, such as those from HCI, appear not to be readily generalisable 
to other domains—which seems to be an inherent weakness of such accounts.  
 
As an example of this latter difficulty, consider Payne et al.’s (1990) Yoked State 
Space (YSS) hypothesis, which he proposed as a way to understand people’s interaction 
with computational systems. The YSS refers to two mental constructs that are 
maintained by the system user—the ‘goal space’ and the ‘device space’—with 
mappings taking place between the two. The goal space represents the possible external 
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states that can be manipulated using the device. The device space represents the possible 
states of the device, in this case a computer system, with ‘device operators’ allowing the 
user to transform states in the device space. A semantic mapping relates the constructs 
in the device space to those in the goal space. A transformation in the goal space is 
achieved through applying operators in the device space. As with SA, we can attempt to 
consider object assembly tasks in terms of the YSS hypothesis. Straightaway, however, 
the goal space and device space in object assembly are far less distinct than in HCI, and, 
indeed, appear to merge. The goal space can be related to the possible states of the 
external assembly object. However the device space either refers once again to the 
actual assembly object, or else is non-existent, as there is no device that is acting on the 
assembly. The YSS hypothesis arguably fits the object-assembly domain far better if the 
goal space is related to the required ‘next state’ of the assembly, as depicted in the 
instructions. The device space then represents the possible states of the assembly object, 
with device operators allowing the user to transform states in the device space, which 
are mapped onto the goal space. This account helps to save the generality of the YSS 
hypothesis—though admittedly at the cost of some stretching of core concepts. It also 
returns us to a consideration of how mental models and mental imagery might allow 
users to reach task-related goals when engaging in mechanical reasoning. 
5.2.  A task-specific framework from mechanical reasoning 
Research into the task-specific mental representations associated with the 
comprehension of mechanical systems is particularly relevant to object assembly since 
both domains involve people seeing or inferring state changes over time (Novick and 
Morse 2000). To understand a mechanical system, including its assembly, people need 
to construct an internal representation of the machine (Hegarty and Just 1993). Hegarty 
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and Sims (1994) describe a three-stage process that requires spatial visualization and the 
transformation of mental images when running a mental model to solve diagram-based 
mechanical reasoning problems. Stage one involves the comprehension of the diagram 
to construct a spatial representation. In stage two this representation is animated, and in 
stage three inferred motion is compared to the problem in question.  
 
The stages proposed by Hegarty and Sims (1994) are elaborated upon by 
Narayanan and Hegarty (1998), who present a more detailed cognitive model of 
people’s comprehension of machines from diagrams. This revised model is highly 
process-oriented and is based upon their own previous research as well as the 
production-system account of diagram processing forwarded by Larkin and Simon 
(1987). Narayanan and Hegarty argue that the comprehension of mechanical systems 
involves the construction of a mental model (their terminology), based on prior 
knowledge, presented information and reasoning skills. Furthermore, working from 
external, static displays involves visualization to infer motion which loads WM, 
especially as the mismatch between the internal and external representation grows as 
motion is inferred. This latter process of mental animation or rehearsal as preparation 
for subsequent action has also been described by Logie (1991). The stages of Narayanan 
and Hegarty’s (1998) cognitive model of machine comprehension can be summarized as 
follows: 
   
Stage 1—Decomposition of the diagram into basic elements. Errors are likely to occur 
owing to poor diagrams and lack of prior knowledge.  
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Stage 2—Construction of a ‘static mental model’, making connections to prior 
knowledge and between components. Poor spatial information and highly schematised, 
unrealistic diagrams can interfere with this process.  
Stage 3—Mental animation using rule-based or imagery-based inference, which is 
dependent on WM capacity. 
 
The third stage of this account is expanded into a full process model of mental 
animation by Narayanan and Hegarty (1998), and this final stage is easily adapted to be 
relevant to domains such as object assembly (see Figure 2). The proposals of Narayanan 
and Hegarty (1998) present a task-specific, process-oriented approach to the 
comprehension of mechanical systems. Although the approach can be applied more 
broadly to related tasks such as object assembly, the model remains limited in terms of 
its reflection of underlying cognition. We propose that more generic frameworks are 
able to present a fuller picture of the cognitive functions involved in a far wider range of 
tasks. We also suggest that task-specific frameworks run the risk of creating further 
divergence in the literature, and that testing a generic framework from alternative 
perspectives is far more likely in the long term to produce a unified approach to mental 
representations. We will return to these points later. 
 
 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
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5.3.  The interconnections between mental representations 
The previous discussion has introduced various different types of mental representation, 
but the interconnection between such representations has only been given limited 
consideration. As noted earlier, researchers, including Johnson-Laird (1996), distinguish 
between mental models and mental images as being different forms of representation. 
Johnson-Laird’s (1996) theoretical shift toward viewing these representations as distinct 
was based on two sources of evidence: (1) the mental rotation studies of Shepard and 
Metzler (e.g. 1971) that pinpointed how an image is a unique representational format 
that preserves perceptual properties of the rotated object; and (2) research showing that 
during reasoning, representations depend on information such as negation that cannot be 
visualized in mental imagery and which must, therefore, be reflected in some abstract, 
token-based system such as mental models (de Vega et al. 1996). This emphasis on the 
differences between images and models, however, begs the question that if they are 
separate, do they co-exist? Furthermore, do images and models interact—perhaps with 
models informing imagery or imagery informing models?  
 
Johnson-Laird (1983) proposes that a mental model, with accompanying imagery, 
can be used in making a decision, which suggests that the two types of representation 
can function in concert to determine action. It can also be posited that mental models 
can place constraints on imagery. For example, during object assembly the situation 
may arise where an abstract (and non-visualizable) element of a mental model exists 
that negates a particular component position. In this way, the mental model could 
constrain the mental imagery used during a task such as object assembly. This ability of 
mental models to limit mental imagery is supported by de Vega et al. (1996), who 
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suggest that evidence of diagrams facilitating comprehension of text-based procedural 
information shows that abstract mental models can control imagery.  
 
Of course, the idea that mental models can constrain imagery would be 
problematic if this was the only form of interaction that could take place between the 
two types of representation. This is because there is much research that suggests that 
diagrams and visual aids are a major benefit to performance, through facilitating 
cognition (e.g. Larkin and Simon 1987) and through reducing WM load (Johnson-Laird 
1996). In particular, visual aids are directly able to facilitate internal mental imagery 
that can enable the attainment of task-related goals (e.g. Kieras and Bovair 1984). 
Although, it could be the case that it is mental imagery alone that provides the 
performance benefit, it seems more likely that mental imagery also informs the 
development of mental models such that there is a bi-directional relationship between 
mental models and imagery. This view is supported by de Vega et al. (1996), who 
suggest that all internal coding systems are uniquely suited to certain forms of 
information, and that real-world tasks are, therefore, unlikely to rely exclusively on one 
single system.  
 
We note that the emphasis on representational separateness that is evident in the 
research literature seems to arise, in part, from a natural human trait to divide and 
classify phenomena in order to understand them. This generates an appearance of 
disconnected representational systems that are, in reality, highly interrelated. This 
conclusion, in turn, demonstrates once again the need for a unified theoretical approach 
to the issue of mental representation. The limitations of the divide-and-conquer 
approach of many cognitive researchers interested in representational issues is echoed in 
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comments by Schwartz and Black (1996), who investigated the use of imagery in the 
simple physical behaviour of the meshing of two gears. Schwartz and Black consider 
whether physical inferences are based on spatial imagery (as suggested by Hegarty and 
Just 1993) or on a representational qualitative calculus (see de Kleer and Brown 1984). 
They suggest that the debate is largely due to different research traditions between those 
supporting spatial reasoning (such as Kosslyn), and the mental models fraternity (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird). The results of their own research support the argument that mechanical 
problems can be solved through analogue imagery, but they also conclude that neither 
qualitative mental models nor purely spatial descriptions can provide a full account of 
their spatial processing tasks. They propose that many imagery and mental model 
theories are united in assuming that people construct representations that ‘reveal’ the 
external environment rather then merely describe it. Schwartz and Black (1996) further 
propose that the primary conceptual entity is the object of reference, and that this can 
bridge the gap between mental imagery and mental models as both are dependent on the 
type of object being considered.  
 
The interrelation between mental representations has also been considered by 
Moray (1999), who describes an individual’s multiple mental representations of a 
system in terms of lattice theory. Each mental representation relates, or maps onto, a 
specific form or function of the system. Therefore, the mental representations are 
‘homomorphisms’ (where system details are not present in their entirety), rather than 
being ‘isomorphisms’ that map precisely onto the physical system. Such homomorphic 
mental representations can involve models or imagery that map onto physical forms, 
physical functions, general functions, goals, means and ends. Moreover, homomorphic 
mental representations create a hierarchy of ‘models from models’ such that mental 
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representations can inform one another: the physical form informs the physical function, 
which, in turn, informs the model of general functionality, which informs the model of 
goals, means and ends. There is, therefore, a progressive development of the user’s 
mental representations as they think about their work (Moray 1999). Moray also uses 
lattice theory to explain causal relations between system components. If two elements in 
a system are related they can be linked in a hierarchy of causal and relational 
connections between system components. In effect, an external representation of a 
lattice reflects the user’s knowledge of a system. Therefore, rather than a single 
complex mental model, each component becomes a mental model which exist at 
different levels within the lattice. In addition, this use of multiple models will reduce the 
processing load associated with a single, complex model. However, it can also lead to 
difficulties; an operator may be at a level in the lattice that does not provide some of the 
key information required to achieve a task-related goal. 
 
This hierarchy of ‘models from models’ resembles the abstraction hierarchy of 
Rasmussen (1986), which implies that users have many mental models of a system that 
can be invoked when appropriate. In contrast, the research presented in Gentner and 
Stevens (1983) aims to discover the mental model relevant to a task, and may, therefore, 
conceal the real nature of task-based models (Moray 1999). The concept of multiple 
models is particularly useful in explaining task failure and not just task success. For 
example, the wrong model could be instantiated and adhered to by an individual. This 
could lead to misinterpretations that might be resistant to change since resulting top-
down influences will impact the operator’s perception of events. In this way Moray 
(1999) interprets the phenomenon of ‘cognitive tunnel vision’ as the inappropriate 
choice of a model and a subsequent unwillingness to change the selected model. 
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Whatever the exact form of mental representations, it seems likely that single pieces of 
information can be encoded in multiple forms which are then used productively in 
problem solving (Petre 1999). However, although multiple models have benefits it is 
also possible that spatial problems which require multiple models are more difficult 
than those based on a single model, with errors being more likely (Byrne and Johnson-
Laird 1989). It is also the case that certain tasks will require multiple models in order 
for all possible interactions to be considered, and a situation that requires fewer models 
is likely to be easier (Johnson-Laird 2001). 
 
Returning to the fundamental relationships between mental models and mental 
images, the literature that we have considered is generally consistent in distinguishing 
between non-visual mental models and visual mental imagery. This distinction implies 
that mental representations of a device do not necessarily have to be visual. 
Furthermore, Tye (1991) proposes a view of hybrid representations, consisting of both 
pictorial and discursive elements, or what one might refer to more simply as ‘labeled 
images’. If we again use object assembly as an example, it is possible that as part of the 
mapping between internal and external representations, propositional labels will be 
attached to components (in either their external or internal form). Let us consider a 
simple assembly where Component A, B or C (‘CA’, ‘CB’ or ‘CC’ respectively) could 
be inserted into a square opening in the existing assembly (‘EA’). It can be proposed 
that if CA was round, then existing knowledge may code CA as ‘NO GO’ without 
further effort, as round pegs do not go into square holes. Mental or physical simulation 
of CB may reveal that it will not insert into EA. CB can then be coded as ‘NO GO’ for 
the current assembly procedure. Mental or physical simulation of CC may reveal it will 
insert into EA and CC is coded ‘GO’. These states can be held as a propositional code 
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in WM with the external components as referents while the assembly procedure is 
further facilitated, such as through the choice of a suitable fastening. This example can 
also be related to how existing knowledge or conceptual models can bias or interfere 
with correct object assembly. Although a round component does not generally fit into a 
square hole, it can, depending upon its size.  
 
The previous proposals suggest that some form of propositional notation would be 
likely to accompany images and their external referents, otherwise imagery alone would 
have to store such propositional information. Likewise, the idea that mental models 
allow for the representation of negation in a way that is difficult to achieve through 
imagery suggests an important role for such models in task performance. Similar 
concepts to Tye’s (1991) notion of labelled images have also emerged in the recent 
literature on mental models in reasoning. For example, Schaeken et al. (in press) 
propose that reasoners construct ‘isomeric’ mental models to represent indeterminacies 
and uncertainties. An isomeric model captures all possibilities (whether determinate or 
indeterminate) within a single mental model via an additional non-analogue element 
(i.e. a propositional or verbal ‘tag’). Another, similar notion is that of ‘annotated’ 
mental models espoused by Vandierendonck et al. (2004).  
 
An alternative perspective to these hybrid views of interrelated representations is 
provided by Barsalou (1999), who proposes that cognition is inherently perceptual in 
nature (i.e. cognition and perceptual systems are not seen as being in any way 
independent). Barsalou claims that the representations that underlie cognition are 
imagistic, and not amodal symbol systems that enter into structures such as schemata. A 
number of arguments against amodal theories are presented, and it is concluded that 
M. Richardson & L. J. Ball 
 44 
other alternatives should be considered. Barsalou notes that when Shepard and Metzler 
(1971) offered image-like representations in WM there was considerable resistance, 
possibly related to the criticisms of imagery within philosophy. Indeed, the task of 
understanding human cognition has required cognitive psychologists to divide and 
conquer restricted areas of cognition and develop theories using amodal computation. 
However, more recently there has been greater acceptance of perceptual theories of 
cognition, and as is often the case in polarised debates it is likely that both imagery and 
amodal systems are used during cognition. Indeed, Barsalou (1999) presents a 
perceptual symbol approach which combines structured amodal representations with a 
dynamic view of imagery to produce a powerful form of multimodal representation. 
Within this theory object-based percepts assume the role often allotted to abstract 
symbols, and perceptual simulation is proposed instead of the symbol manipulation that 
is typically claimed to be used in domains such as deductive reasoning. The theory of 
perceptual symbols and the role of simulation in conceptualization is claimed to liberate 
cognitive science from a basis in amodal computation (Fauconnier 1999). 
5.4.  Static versus dynamic representations 
Barsalou’s (1999) reference to simulation in WM brings us back to the issue of dynamic 
representations that we touched upon earlier. It is generally proposed that mental 
representations, both mental models and imagery, can be dynamic rather than purely 
static, and there is considerable support for this notion. If we start with the case of 
mental models, a number of studies maintain the existence of such dynamism and refer 
to concepts such as ‘running a mental model’ (Ehrlich 1996), ‘envisioning’ (de Kleer 
and Brown 1983) and ‘simulating in the mind’s eye’ (Sims and Hegarty 1997). As 
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Carroll and Olson (1988, p. 51) put it: ‘A key feature of a mental model is that it can be 
“run” with trial, exploratory inputs and observed for its resultant behaviour’.  
 
This latter notion of running a model is especially commonplace in the literature 
(see, for example, the volume by Gentner and Stevens 1983), and captures very 
effectively the idea that a model can be deployed to test out the possible outcomes of an 
action in advance of taking that action. Indeed, it is the running of the model which 
allows it to be used predictively in advance of performing some action. If the model was 
static, prediction would not be possible. A somewhat different perspective on 
representational dynamism and mental models is provided by Bibby (1992), who sees 
mental models as being produced in an active process through the dynamic use of 
several interacting representations. This brings forward the notion that not only can a 
mental representation depict a dynamic situation in the external environment, but that 
the interaction between these mental representations can itself be dynamic.  
 
In relation to image-based representations, Paivio and Clark (1991) consider the 
contrast between static and dynamic mental imagery, but do not attempt to justify the 
existence of dynamic imagery, instead speculating on its possible underlying 
mechanisms. There is, however, considerable support in the literature for the existence 
of dynamic mental imagery. For example, Pani (1996) rejects static ‘picture in the head’ 
approaches to imagery and proposes that symbolic, abstract, schematic images are 
active in nature. The concept of dynamic imagery is also noted by Brewer (1999), and 
Denis (1991) refers to models relying on imagery as being more than static cognitive 
entities, instead involving dynamic simulation and manipulation. With diagrams, too, 
people form visual representations of the diagram and can imagine moving about pieces 
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to solve a task. These movements are taken by Johnson-Laird (1996) to be visual 
transformations of images. Likewise, too, Narayanan and Hegarty (1998), in their 
cognitive model of mechanical comprehension, refer to ‘mental animation’ using rule or 
imagery-based inference. They suggest several lines of evidence for this, including the 
work of Sims and Hegarty (1997), Schwartz and Black (1996) and studies indicating the 
importance of physical gestures when people reason about dynamic physical systems 
(e.g. Clement 1994). 
 
With regards to the location of dynamic models and images, it has been noted 
previously that non-conceptual mental representations reside in WM, and, therefore, this 
must be where they are run. For example, Cañas and Antolí (1998) propose that mental 
models are dynamic representations created in WM that are constructed by combining 
information stored in LTM and information extracted from the environment. Likewise, 
Barsalou (1999) specifies WM when referring to running perceptual simulations. The 
dynamic nature of WM is in contrast to the more static characterization of LTM. For 
example, Wilson and Rutherford (1989, p. 625) refer to mental models as being 
‘computationally dynamic’ in comparison to structures such as schemata that represent 
background knowledge. Likewise, Ehrlich (1996) describes mental simulation as a 
dynamic process of building, running and perhaps changing internal mental 
representations, and contrasts mental models with schemata, which are argued to be 
static LTM representations. 
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6. Representations, Problem Solving and Cognitive Task Performance 
6.1.  Representations and problem solving 
The sections above have presented a detailed discussion of issues concerning the nature 
and functioning of the mental representations that underpin cognitive task performance. 
Since it can be argued that all higher-level cognitive tasks are fundamentally problem 
solving tasks because of their goal-directed nature (Anderson 2000), then a brief 
consideration of the topic of problem solving could potentially add useful insights to the 
current review.  
 
Three essential features can be identified in problem solving (Newell and Simon 
1972). First, cognition is directed towards some end goal (e.g. the achievement of a 
task). Second, this goal can be broken down into subgoals or subtasks. Third, the 
subgoals are achieved through applying actions or operators that transform states of the 
problem. Once a problem has been repeatedly solved it becomes a learned procedure. 
Problem solving is frequently described in terms of a ‘problem space’, which consists of 
the many, various possible states of the problem, with the term ‘state’ referring to the 
representation of the problem at some degree of solution (Newell and Simon 1972). The 
problem solver, then moves from an initial state, through intermediate states, to a goal 
state. These states define the problem space. In this way, problem solving is about 
searching through the problem space for a path to the goal state by applying ‘operators’ 
that can move the problem solver from one state to another. 
 
A significant question at this point is how does the problem solver select an 
operator when there are a number that may be available? Problem solving operators can 
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be found through discovery, or through learning via instruction, or by observation. A 
further proposed method of operator selection is ‘difference reduction’, whereby 
operators are chosen that reduce the difference between the current state and the goal 
state. The so called ‘means-ends analysis’ heuristic proposed by Newell and Simon 
(1972) is one highly effective strategy for operator selection that is based on identifying 
the biggest difference between one’s current state and a goal state. Much of the strength 
of means-ends analysis resides in the fact that the strategy can: (1) add a new sub-goal 
to reduce an area of difference between the current state and the goal; and (2) invoke 
itself recursively to achieve the subgoal, at which point the strategy can recommence to 
progress toward the main goal. A further theoretical proposal relating to effective 
problem solving is that of ‘backup avoidance’, which relates to the idea that people are 
biased against any action that returns them to the previous state. With regard to mental 
representations, backup avoidance also relates to the view that a mental representation 
can have a persisting influence on performance as people protect their misconceptions 
(Gopher et al. 1985).  
  
When considering the activity of problem solving from a more unified 
perspective, it seems clear that it is essentially a process of constructing representations 
in working memory that lead from an initial state to a goal state (Barsalou 1999; see 
also Visser 2006 for a related proposal in the context of problem solving in the domain 
of design). The process of working forward or backward between the initial and goal 
states involves simulating a plan that may achieve the goal. Furthermore, a component 
may be added to the simulation either due to prior knowledge of what has been 
successful in the past (what are termed ‘set effects’ in problem solving theory), or 
because simulations suggest that the component may work. In a similar way, the related 
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domain of decision making can be viewed as involving the application of various 
adaptations to a simulated plan to see which version offers the best outcome. As 
possible plans are formed, each is simulated to assess which works best (Barsalou, 
1999). The proposal that mental representations underlie cognition in areas such as 
problem solving and decision making is further supported by Johnson-Laird (1983), 
who also explains reasoning behaviour using mental models theory. Furthermore, Payne 
(1992) includes the notion of the problem space as an example of the mental models 
concept and states that there is a clear overlap in ideas. Indeed, Simon (1989) himself 
refers to the problem space as being a mental model of the task domain. In these ways, 
then it can be clearly seen that mental representations are claimed to underlie all aspects 
of higher-level thinking, including problem solving, decision making and reasoning.  
6.2.  Representations and display-based problem solving 
Although we have discussed above how mental representations underlie thinking, the 
focus has been entirely on internal representations, yet it is clear that most tasks exist in 
an environment that is external to the mind and that can, therefore, interact with it. 
Indeed, this essential notion of ‘human-machine interaction’ is at the core of most 
ergonomics research. When considering theoretical issues such as mental representation 
it is easy to forget the role of the external world that must, at the very least, inform 
ongoing cognition. For example, ‘affordances’ are the information in the environment 
that can guide behaviour and provide action opportunities directly through perceptual 
processes (Gibson, 1979). Zhang (1997) describes how the actions supported by 
affordances do not depend solely upon their physical properties, but also upon the 
properties of the perceiver. Whilst affordances can make a task easier, they can equally 
make it more difficult.  
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In terms of visuospatial cognition, Johnson-Laird (1996) argues that reasoning 
becomes difficult when the possibilities increase (as this taxes WM), and it is suggested 
that the construction of internal mental representations will be easier if an external 
model or diagram is available. Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) found that diagrams can 
help individuals reason, improving both the speed and accuracy of deduction. With a 
diagram people appear to form a visual representation of the depicted information and 
then imagine moving elements around this image to solve the task (Johnson-Laird 
1996). Zhang (1997) considers external representations in problem solving in great 
detail, and proposes that much about the internal mind can be learned through studying 
external representations, since the mind reflects the structure of the external world. 
External representations are intrinsic to many tasks and will therefore guide or even 
determine cognition. Clearly the implications of this view for ergonomics science are 
critical, since it suggests that any tasks involving a predominance of external 
information (e.g. object assembly or interface-driven system interaction) need to be 
researched with very careful consideration to the role of external displays on cognitive 
functioning.  
  
Like Johnson-Laird (1996), Zhang (1997) is especially keen to emphasize the 
striking benefit of diagrams for task performance, and notes how information can be 
processed by perceptual systems alone, such that internal representations may not even 
be required for performance if external representations are available. This view clearly 
contrasts with the common assumption inherent in traditional research in Artificial 
Intelligence and Cognitive Science, which views external information as being 
internalized before internal processing is then externalized (e.g. Newell 1990). Under 
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Zhang’s view it is possible that problem solving is no longer the higher-level cognitive 
task that it is typically assumed to be.  
 
In related work, Larkin (1989) emphasizes that problem solving is often 
performed with external displays or physical objects that may form an extremely 
important resource. She notes that most models of problem solving only really consider 
internal reasoning during problem solving as opposed to the role of external displays. 
Larkin (1989), therefore, proposes a model of ‘display based problem solving’, which 
assumes that often very little information needs to be held in WM, since many attributes 
can be observed in the external environment. The central premise of the display-based 
problem-solving model is that the external display is the main representation of the 
current problem state. If internal goals or information are lost then they can always be 
reconstructed from the display. Larkin (1989) notes that there is a crucial interaction 
between the external display and internal problem solving processes, with problem 
solving being facilitated by a good display. An effective display is one that shows all of 
the essential features of the current problem state and does not hide crucial information. 
Failure to encode essential features of the display will typically lead to problem-solving 
errors. The importance of the external environment is also noted in SA theories, but 
often not considered in the mental models literature. 
6.3.  The nature and functioning of external representations 
It has been proposed above that external representations impact on problem solving to 
create the concept of display-based problem solving. In this respect, it is clear why 
O’Malley and Draper (1992) argue that understanding the nature of the interaction 
between users and tasks is the best way to obtain a good understanding of users’ mental 
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representations, especially for tasks where much of the information needed for effective 
performance is presented externally. Essentially, then, it cannot simply be assumed that 
all of the information required for a task must be internalized. This criticism of the 
narrow view that can stem from mental representations research can also be related to 
problem solving research, where users’ behaviour is not solely the result of internal 
goal-directed activity; it also relates to the impact of physical and functional aspects of 
external devices (Young and Simon 1987).  
 
O’Malley and Draper (1992) argue that at times people may not even have a 
model from which knowledge about the task can be derived, as sometimes information 
can be extracted or provided by the task and its environment (a point also noted by 
Moray 1999; see, too, the view of Zhang 1997 presented above). At some level, 
however, it must be the case that a system user will at least have to possess the 
knowledge required to interrogate the environment for the information required. 
Nevertheless, it is certain that the internal and external distribution of knowledge makes 
the capturing of mental representations inherently difficult for researchers. Indeed, 
studies suggests that when using display-based systems, users do not internalize a great 
deal of information (Payne 1991a), and only use internal representations when 
necessary (i.e. when information is not available externally), which can lead to highly 
fragmentary internal representations (O’Malley and Draper 1992). These observations 
have led to the concept of ‘distributed models’, where internal representations are 
complemented by external representations.  
 
At this point it seems useful to return in more detail to the question of what 
information external representations provide? Larkin and Simon (1987) specify the 
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advantages of external representations or diagrams, in particular identifying how 
diagrammatic external representations can assist in search, recognition, and inference—
three key components of information processing. Larkin and Simon describe the most 
important advantage of external representations in the form of diagrams as being the 
efficiency of search that they afford and the explicitness of information that they 
provide; essentially, the perceptual work is automatic and easy. Diagrams also facilitate 
inference, since basic (perceptual) information can be perceived initially with little 
effort. For example, spatial relationships do not have to be described; they are 
immediately apparent. People can also use perceived information as cues to retrieve 
problem-relevant inference-operators from memory. However, this means that external 
representations are only useful to those who know the appropriate computational 
processes for taking advantage of them. 
 
Research subsequent to that of Larkin and Simon (1987) has generally supported 
the benefits for task performance that are engendered by external representations. For 
example, Cox (1999) notes how external representations reduce search and WM load 
and promote distributed cognition that involves neither wholly internal nor entirely 
external representations, instead involving a seamless interaction between both 
representational domains. Cox also claims that illustrations encourage the formation of 
‘spatial mental models’, and that the comprehension of external representations makes 
use of the visuospatial sketchpad component of WM. With regard to imagery and 
reasoning with an external representation, Stenning and Oberlander (1991, 1995) 
suggest that the non-abstract nature of mental images provides an advantage by 
reducing the number of possible interpretations of a situation that are possible, thereby 
making reasoning from diagrams more efficient. The interaction between internal and 
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external representations noted by Cox (1999) and O’Malley and Draper (1992) is further 
supported by Bryant and Tversky (1999). They emphasize that external representations 
in the form of ‘schematics’ (i.e. simplifications of the represented world) can affect how 
a depiction is mentally interpreted and used. Such schematics and display designs can 
simplify the world by omitting, adding, or distorting information, thus affecting 
people’s mental representations, which further schematizes the information. Bryant and 
Tversky (1999) also note that diagrams may depict 3-D relations, but are themselves 2-
D, whereas external models are 3-D. Interestingly, Bryant and Tversky found that 
external models promoted 3-D mental representations whilst diagrams required some 
instruction to be fully exploited. Essentially, then, the external models and diagrams 
created different kinds of mental representations. 
 
Having discussed evidence for the view that external representations can have a 
marked impact on cognitive actions when problem solving, we now consider Zhang’s 
(1997) theoretical framework that attempts to encapsulate the links between the 
structure of tasks and external and internal representations. Within Zhang’s framework, 
‘operations’ are representation-specific, for example, external representations activate 
‘perceptual operations’ such as component selection during object assembly, whereas 
internal representations activate ‘cognitive operations’. Lookahead—the process of 
mentally imagining and evaluating actions—is used to choose which action to take. This 
lookahead process would appear to resemble the use of mental imagery introduced 
previously. The central control component of the framework is the most complicated 
aspect of the theory—but arguably the least specified—and includes WM, learning, and 
decision making. Its importance in Zhang’s framework relates to the coordination of the 
level of attention given to external and internal representations, and hence perceptual 
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and cognitive operations. Although the framework does not require internalization of 
external representations, this does not mean that internal and external representations 
function entirely independently, as external representations still have to be processed by 
internal perceptual mechanisms.  
 
In reviewing what they refer to as ‘external cognition’, Scaife and Rogers (1996) 
propose the need for considerably more research into graphical representations based on 
an analysis of the interactivity between external and internal representations. Although 
related specifically to ‘graphical’ representations, their conclusions seem generalizable 
to any tasks involving an external component. Scaife and Rogers (1996) remark on the 
three central characteristics of the emerging literature on internal and external 
representations as being an emphasis on: (1) ‘computational offloading’, whereby 
external representations reduce the amount of cognitive effort required; (2) ‘re-
representation’, whereby external representations have the same abstract structure as 
internal representations; and (3) ‘constraining’, which refers to the way external 
representations can influence the inferences made about the represented world.  
 
We note here that Scaife and Rogers’ (1996) views closely parallel the proposals 
summarized above by Larkin (1989), O’Malley and Draper (1992), Zhang (1997), 
Bryant and Tversky (1999) and Cox (1999), who all presents a fundamentally similar 
picture that emphasizes the benefits of external representations in cognition. Moreover, 
when considering external representations (including related notions of ‘distributed 
models’ and ‘distributed cognition’) the researchers above frequently remind us that the 
interaction between internal cognition and the external components of a task must be 
considered in combination, since external representations certainly will impact on the 
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nature and scope of internal representations (cf. Zhang 1997). It seems sensible to 
conclude, therefore, that task-based interactions fundamentally involve multiple mental 
representations manipulated in WM, that are informed by knowledge and constrained 
by the external environment.  
6.4.  Cognitive constraints on mental representation 
The focus of much of the literature presented above has been on the mental 
representations that underlie task performance. However, it is important also to consider 
aspects of the overarching cognitive system that may constrain the nature and 
functioning of mental representations. Indeed, one fundamental conclusion that has been 
drawn from the previous discussions is that the construction and manipulation of mental 
representations can place a considerable demand on cognitive resources, although the 
specific nature of the task, instructions, and associated mental representations will all 
influence the specific level of demand. Sweller’s (e.g. 1988) ‘Cognitive Load Theory’ 
deals head on with this interaction between cognitive structures and task-based 
information, as well as with the resulting implications for task performance and 
learning.   
 
These issues of task demand and mental representation can also be considered 
more generally from the perspective of theories that discuss the limitations of the human 
information-processing system, such as the capacity constraints of WM (Miller 1956). 
For example, it has been noted above that mental representations exist in WM, and it is 
likely that more specialized sub-systems of WM exist for dealing with mental imagery 
and mental models. In particular, the visuospatial sketchpad component of WM (Logie 
1991, Baddeley 2002) is claimed to be dedicated to the processing of visuospatial 
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information, although Miyake et al. (2001) have also found evidence to support the 
proposal that the visuospatial sketchpad is closely tied to the central executive 
component, thus potentially implicating a number of aspects of WM in visuospatial task 
performance.  
  
A further, key issue in cognition concerns individual differences that are known to 
exist in WM and which can vary dependent upon the task (e.g. whether it calls upon 
verbal or visuo-spatial resources). There are, for example, observable differences across 
individuals in spatial abilities such as mental rotation performance (Karadi et al. 2001), 
and it can be expected, too, that there will be discernable differences in people’s 
underlying mental representations. Indeed, de Vega et al. (1996) support the notion of 
individual differences in visuospatial ability, and take the view that it can be measured 
through tests that require mental re-assembly or rotation. The precise location of such 
individual differences in ability remains unclear, but is postulated to be related to 
effortful processes that underpin the construction of mental representations. Baggett and 
Ehrenfeucht (1988) also found difference between individuals’ conceptual models, and 
observed both typical and atypical conceptualizations of objects during assembly tasks. 
7.  Toward an Integrated Representations Framework 
The journey that has been mapped out thus far in the paper has passed from mental 
models and visuospatial cognition, through discussions of the nature of external 
representations, and has ended up considering critical interactions that take place 
between internal cognition and external task components. This latter human-machine 
interaction or ergonomics approach, in fact, brings us full circle to the fundamental aim 
of the present paper, which was to gain an understanding of the representations 
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associated with performance when people work with technological systems to achieve 
task-related goals. The recognition of the inherent interactivity between external and 
internal representational domains underlines the importance of applying research 
methodologies that are capable of examining tasks and cognition in an integrated 
manner rather than in isolation. For example, Richardson et al. (2006) present a 
methodology for studying such interactions in the domain of object assembly. In their 
research they proposed a whole range of external characteristics possessed by assembly 
objects that should, on a priori grounds, have predictable effects on internal cognition, 
and they then went on to examine such influences empirically.  
 
Returning to the core issue of the nature of internal representations, we are left in 
no doubt that such representations can be described in a large number of different ways 
and from a vast array of different perspectives. As such, any attempt at formulating a 
unified, descriptive framework for encompassing mental representational concepts is 
very likely to falter (cf. Payne 1991b), at least in the short term. As such, any proposals 
in the current section are perhaps best viewed as an attempt to bring together some 
useful, high-level insights from the literature that we have reviewed in a way that can 
provoke further debate and discussion, and that may help, in time, to advance theoretical 
understanding and conceptual rapprochement. With these caveats in mind, what we 
sketch out below are the core elements of a generic cognitive framework that aims to 
capture the representations and processes that underlie task-based, goal-directed 
performance (see Figure 3). As is readily apparent from the visual depiction of this 
framework in Figure 3, we draw heavily on conclusions about mental representations 
introduced earlier by Endsley (2000), Moray (1999) and Zhang (1997). 
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[Insert figure 3 about here] 
 
 
The work of Moray (1999) is considered as particularly important to our proposed 
‘Integrated Representations Framework’ because of its completeness and its sheer 
breadth of scope. First, Moray’s refers very effectively to the classic mental models 
literature, and his proposals that are based around the mental models concept are neither 
domain-specific nor task-specific in emphasis. Second, Moray’s theoretical viewpoint 
encapsulates the importance of multiple mental representations and the role of the 
environment in task performance. Third, Moray himself builds upon an observed degree 
of convergence in the literature that leads to the possibility that a unified approach to 
mental models can be developed. The theoretical position of Zhang (1997) is likewise 
considered important to our Integrated Representations Framework because it 
complements Moray’s (1999) proposals whilst also paying particularly careful attention 
to the role of external representations in problem solving—which relates to Moray’s 
notion of the ‘environment’ whilst also being distinct in important ways. In particular, 
Zhang’s recognition of the importance of ‘perceptual operations’ in task performance is 
seen as a real strength over other perspectives that tend to overemphasize the dominance 
of cognitive operations. Finally, the theory of SA and the work of Endsley (e.g. 2000) is 
of key relevance, both because it has become so well established and because its 
conceptual underpinnings and terminology (e.g. emphasising the role of mental models 
and goals in task performance) allow for an excellent degree of integration with the 
perspectives of Moray (1999) and Zhang (1997). We are especially impressed by the 
fact that much of Endsley’s SA theorizing has a strong basis in previous ergonomics-
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related literatures, such as Wickens’ (1992) pioneering model of information processing 
and task-based activity. Proposals deriving from the SA perspective also add new 
elements to our Integrated Representations Framework, such as the idea that external 
features of the environment can include workload and stress, and the notion that the 
‘interface’ between the internal and the external is a core theoretical construct, which 
itself embodies information-processing mechanisms such as attention, perception and 
feedback. 
 
Although aspects of terminology and structure certainly do differ—sometimes 
quite markedly—across the proposals of Endsley (2000), Moray (1999) and Zhang 
(1997), all three theories have a number of similarities. Some degree of commonality is, 
perhaps, only to be expected, such as the inclusion of mappings between components 
such as mental imagery, LTM and WM. More notably, Zhang proposes that external 
and internal relationships relate directly to task structure, a claim that relates to Moray's 
notion of certain mental representations being linked to either system form or system 
function. The key differences between these two proposals, however, appear to reside in 
Zhang’s inclusion of perceptual operations and Moray's conceptualization of multiple 
mental representations. Certain, more specific differences between Zhang and Moray’s 
theories, are not considered in our Integrated Representations Framework. For example, 
Zhang chooses to group the components of his theory differently, such as learned 
knowledge being combined with lookahead, whilst Zhang does not specify or separate 
scripts and plans from actions. Although much of the content from Endsley (2000) is 
mirrored in the frameworks of Zhang (1997) and Moray (1999) it adds to the processes 
and mechanisms involved. The models of Endsley highlight the impact of stress and 
workload and individual qualities such as experience and training. Endsley also brings 
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the interface between the task and cognition to the fore, such as aspects of information 
processing and, for example, the need for perception before comprehension and 
lookahead (or projection) can occur. 
 
It is with an emphasis on the similarities between extant theories, rather than their 
subtle differences, that we propose the Integrated Representations Framework depicted 
in Figure 3, which summarizes in a diagrammatic form many of the core concepts from 
the literature on mental and external representations and their interaction. Its greatest 
strength is arguably that it brings together the proposals of Endsley (2000), Moray 
(1999) and Zhang (1997), which are theories that themselves embody many of the 
central notions concerning representational issues that have been presented in this 
review. In terms of the actual notation associated with our proposed framework, we 
follow Zhang (1997) very closely in highlighting ‘external representations’, and we 
include ‘the task’ and ‘the environment’ as fundamental constructs that are part of this 
external representation. The task is the problem to be solved, and the environment is the 
medium in which the task is embodied (Moray 1999). These external representations are 
perceived by a problem solver or system operative and can lead directly to perceptual 
operations, such as component search, or to the construction of mental representations 
in WM. These mental representations can involve mental models or mental imagery, 
and map onto physical form, physical function, general function, goals, means and ends 
(Moray 1999). Mental representations can also sustain ‘lookahead’, the process of 
mentally imagining and evaluating actions in order to choose which action to take 
(Zhang 1997). The mental representations are informed by—and themselves inform—
LTM representations such as conceptual models and schemata. Conceptual models and 
schemata in LTM, together with the outputs of mental representations in WM, inform 
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the scripts and plans that form the actions taken on the task. The ‘central control’ 
component relates to the ongoing coordination of perceptual and cognitive operations 
within the framework. The importance of central control within Zhang’s theory relates 
particularly to the level of attention given to external and internal representations and to 
the integration of information from these external and internal representations (Zhang 
1997). 
 
As a final few comments on our proposals, we again reiterate that there is likely to 
be no single, optimal theoretical framework for considering external and mental 
representations for some time to come, but we believe that it is still of considerable 
value to draw out aspects of commonality across theories whilst recognising elements of 
uncertainty. In a similar, cautionary remark, Moray (1999) refers to his proposal of 
mappings in mental models as a ‘rough indication’ rather than a definitive account. We 
also acknowledge that we have not attempted to cover concepts relating to shared 
mental models (e.g. Levesque et al. 2001) or team mental models (e.g. Langan-Fox et 
al. 2004) as part of theoretical framework. This omission, however, simply reflects an 
effort to maintain a degree of focus in our attempt at conceptual integration. Indeed, 
understanding the way in which mental models support team-working practices and 
performance strikes us as being a critically important direction for future research. 
Moreover, as work in this area matures we are certain that the concept of a team mental 
model is one that will need to be entertained very seriously as part of any broader 
theoretical framework for capturing the nature of mental representations in work-based 
activity. 
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8. Conclusions 
The literature that has been reviewed in this paper has led to the proposal that cognitive 
task performance fundamentally involves multiple mental representations manipulated 
in WM, which are informed by knowledge in LTM and information in the external 
environment. As such, there is a continuous interaction between external representations 
and internal cognition, which means that external components of the task must be taken 
seriously in theoretical accounts of goal-directed cognition. These proposals lead to the 
view that understanding human-machine interaction is central to an effective conceptual 
analysis of the nature of internal and external representations and the way that they play 
out in real-world, task-oriented activities, whether these arise in professional work 
domains such as those involving people using complex interactive technologies (e.g. in 
safety-critical, process-control contexts), or in more mundane everyday situations such 
as day-to-day human-computer interaction or object and furniture assembly. 
 
Developing these proposals further, we have argued that it is possible to formulate 
a unified theoretical framework to capture the nature and inter-relations between mental 
representations and external representations that is based around an integration of the 
theories of Endsley (2000), Moray (1999) and Zhang (1997). Indeed, the degree of 
convergence between these three different approaches is such that the resulting 
Integrated Representations Framework that we propose appears to provide a more 
comprehensive account of the representations involved in task performance than either 
of the component theories can provide on its own. The Integrated Representations 
Framework that we present details internal cognitive mechanisms and representational 
constructs, whilst also providing a basis for considering human-task interaction in the 
context of a given external environment. We would further argue that any attempt 
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toward a unified approach to theory development is better served by testing a generic 
framework from alternative perspectives, as opposed to the alternative research strategy 
of creating and evaluating highly task-specific frameworks that do little to integrate 
concepts across multiple tasks, domains and research traditions. Paradoxically, 
however, it seems that much of the recent research on issues relating to mental 
representations and task performance has tended to pursue the more task-specific 
agenda, which we believe has led to considerable theoretical fragmentation. Indeed, the 
indication of the lack of a unified approach in the literature is the very failure by many 
researchers even to clarify and define what is meant by the terms that they use such as 
‘mental model’.  
 
The theorizing of Endsley (2000), Moray (1999) and Zhang (1997) is, perhaps, 
unique in its integrative stance, as well as its clear attempt to define and use 
representational terminology in a consistent way that is faithful to its origins in 
pioneering research. In drawing upon these authors’ theories, we have presented a 
summary of key proposals in the form of a diagrammatic overview that can inform an 
understanding of any task-based activity. Moreover, if a researcher needs to develop a 
detailed process-model of a particular task, then our framework can be consulted so as 
to inform an emerging task analysis. We conclude by reiterating that an integrated 
approach to representational issues associated with task performance has the key benefit 
of reducing the fragmentation and divergence that derives from developing highly 
specific frameworks for understanding particular tasks. Testing such a generic 
framework from a range of perspectives is, we believe, far more likely in the long run to 
produce a fully unified approach to issues of internal and external representation which 
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underlie the human-machine interactions that are fundamental to ergonomics as a 
science. 
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Figure 1. A simple assembly task. 
 
Table 1. Examples of mental representation terminology. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of Stage 3 of the cognitive model of machine comprehension by Narayanan and 
Hegarty (1998). Adapted to refer to object assembly. 
 
Figure 3. An Integrated Representations Framework summarizing internal and external representations 
and SA in task performance. Adapted from Endsley (2000), Moray (1999), Zhang (1997). 



















Mental Representation This is a generic concept that covers the full range of representational formats, including 
propositions, mental images and mental models (de Vega et al. 1996).  
Internal Representation Internal representation is a catchall term that is often used interchangeably with that of 
mental representation, but which is sometimes used as synonym for mental model (Wilson 
and Rutherford 1989). 
Mental Image Mental imagery is a potential medium for thought, whereby visual images are manipulated 
to perform mental simulations of physical objects (Kosslyn 1994, Denis 1991). 
Proposition Propositional representations are logic-like descriptions involving predicate-argument 
formalisms that encompass information in a way that has some resemblance to natural 
language (Pylyshyn 2002). As such, propositions are often taken as a way to encode verbal 
information (Paivio 1971), although they can encode visual information (Pylyshyn 2003).  
Mental Model Craik (1943) first proposed the notion of ‘small-scale models’ of reality, and Johnson-Laird 
(e.g. 1983) took up the term in a more restricted sense to refer to a specific type of mental 
representation held in working memory which is abstract and spatial but not visualizable 
(see also Johnson-Laird 2004). However, the term mental model has been freely applied by 
many researchers to denote virtually any representation of knowledge about devices 
(Tauber 1988). For example, Endsley (2000) discusses Situation Awareness theory in 
which mental models are associated with schemata in long-term memory. 
User’s Model The idea that users have models of the operating characteristics of interactive systems or 
devices (e.g. computer-based technologies) is an instantiation of the mental models notion 
as described by Johnson-Laird (1983), and works along the same principles (Manktelow 
and Jones 1987). 
Mental Simulation Mental simulation is a term introduced by Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) to refer to a process 
where a sequence of events is consciously enacted (e.g. to determine cause-effect 
relationships or to predict outcomes). 
Situation Model  Situation model is a term adopted by Situation Awareness theorists to refer to a model that 
guides attention, integrates perceived information and provides a mechanism for predicting 
future sates of a system (Endsley 2000). 
Operative Image The operative image or model is a mental image of the device generated during the task 
interaction. It is dynamic and regulates activity (Oshanin 1966). 
Conceptual Model Welford’s (1961) concept of a conceptual model is viewed as being an approximate, 
inexact, yet holistic mental image that is not task specific. In Activity Theory it is described 
as the ‘inner idiosyncratic world of the operator’ based on experience and instruction and 
held in long-term memory. As such, a conceptual model is static and resistant to change 
(Bedny et al. 2004). 
Dynamic Model The concept of a dynamic model, introduced in Activity Theory in the mid 1980s, is 
viewed as consisting of different aspects (including imagery) and is a representation 
created in working memory from operative thinking and information drawn from the 
conceptual model. A dynamic model can be related to the concepts of a situation model and 
an operative image (Bedny et al. 2004). 
Conceptualization This term has been used to refer to a person’s mental representation of the hierarchy of 
subassemblies for an object (Baggett and Ehrenfeucht 1988). 
Device Model A device model is an individual’s understanding of how a device works in terms of its 
internal structure and processes (Kieras and Bovair 1984).  
Spatial Visualisation Spatial visualisation is described as a type of representation that can be used to solve 
mechanical problems (Hegarty et al. 2003).  
Shared Mental Model Shared mental models are knowledge structures held by team members that enable task 
goals and team demands to be met (Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993; Levesque et al. 2001). 
Team Mental Model The concept of a team mental model draws on team-working theory and is claimed to be 
distinct from the notion of a shared mental model (Langan-Fox et al. 2004). Team mental 
models reflect an understanding of team goals and team-member skills. As such, they 
provide organized expectations for team performance, enabling timely and accurate 
predictions to be made regarding team-member behaviour (Langan-Fox et al. 2004). 
 



























Select the most recent hypothesis about the current assembly 
procedure and associated components from working memory. 
Retrieve prior knowledge, if available, about the assembly procedure 
and associated components and its hypothesised assembly. 
Scan the instructions and current state of assembly object to retrieve 
information about the current assembly procedure and associated 
components. 
Generate hypotheses about the current assembly procedure and 
positioning of associated components by: 
 
Rule based inference of assembly procedure. 
OR 
Internally simulating the current assembly procedure. 
Add the new hypotheses to working memory. 
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